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The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation:
Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing
Euthanasia
By DAVID ORBNTLICHER*
According to conventional wisdom, the United States Supreme Court
last year reaffirmed the long-standing distinction between "passive" forms
of physician aid-in-dying, like the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment,
and "active" forms of physician aid-in-dying, like assisted suicide and
euthanasia.' At first glance, this seems to be what happened. By a 9-0
vote in Washington v. Glucksberg,2 the Court rejected the claim that just as
substantive due process includes a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment,
it also includes a right to physician-assisted suicide. Similarly, by a 9-0
vote in Vacco v. Quill,3 the Court rejected the claim that it is a denial of
equal protection when some terminally ill persons can end their lives with
a refusal of life-sustaining treatment while other terminally ill persons can-
. Visiting DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University; Associate Professor of
Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and Health, Indiana University School of Law-
Indianapolis. A.B., Brandeis, 1977; M.D., Harvard, 1981; J.D., Harvard, 1986. I am grateful for
the contributions of David Faigman, Judy Failer, John Hansen-Flaschen, Ron Krotoszynski,
Timothy Quill, andDavid H. Smith. I am also grateful to the members of the Hastings Constitu-
tional Law Quarterly who assisted in the publication of this Article. This Article draws on ideas
presented in David Orentlicher, The Supreme Court and Physician-Assisted Suicide-Rejecting
Assisted Suicide but Embracing Euthanasia, 337 NFW ENG. J. MED. 1236 (1997). Portions of
that article are included with the permission of the New England Journal of Medicine.
I. I put the words passive and active in quotation marks because withdrawals of life-
sustaining treatment involve action. Turning off a ventilator, for example, is an action. Never-
theless, writers commonly characterize withdrawals of treatment as passive, and it is useful to
have different terms to distinguish between withdrawal (or withholding) of treatment on the one
hand and assisted suicide and euthanasia on the other hand.
Withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment refers to situations in which physicians discontinue
the provision of health care (for example, ventilator, dialysis, feeding tube) that is necessary to
sustain a patient's life. Physician-assisted suicide refers to situations in which a physician pro-
vides a patient with a lethal dose of medication (or a prescription for the medication), and the
patient takes the medication immediately or at a later time. Euthanasia refers to situations in
which a physician administers a lethal dose of medication to bring about a patient's death.
2. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
3. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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not end their lives with physician-assisted suicide.4 The Court held that, as
a constitutional matter, the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
suicide assistance is sufficiently important to justify a right to the former,
but not the latter; the states must permit patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, but they need not permit patients to obtain a prescription for an
overdose of barbiturates or other drugs from their physicians.5
In fact, however, the conventional wisdom is wrong. In its effort to
respond to the moral sentiments that drive right-to-die law, the Court pre-
served the distinction between treatment withdrawal and suicide assistance
only by breaking down the distinction between treatment withdrawal and
euthanasia. Faced with the argument that assisted suicide is the only way
to respond to the severe suffering of some dying patients, members of the
Court observed that these patients can turn to the alternative of terminal
sedation.6  Often, however, terminal sedation is essentially a form of
euthanasia.
In conceding, even encouraging, the availability of terminal sedation,
the Court not only blurred the formal distinction between treatment with-
drawal and euthanasia, it also undermined some of the important argu-
ments against legalizing assisted suicide or euthanasia. In particular, by
implicitly concluding that terminal sedation can be employed by physi-
cians without significant abuse, the Court undermines the objection to as-
sisted suicide and euthanasia that their legalization would be followed by
significant abuse.
More importantly, the Court's decision leaves society with a constitu-
tional scheme that is ethically more problematic than if the Court had
found a right to physician-assisted suicide. Terminal sedation not only
serves fewer of the purposes of right-to-die law, it also poses greater risks
for patient welfare than does physician-assisted suicide.7
I. The Court's Decision
The Supreme Court's rejection of a right to assisted suicide was
widely expected.8 In the context of a substantive due process jurispru-
4. Id. at 2297-98.
5. See id. at2301-02.
6. See id. Terminal sedation is offered to dying patients who are suffering greatly and for
whom conventional treatments are inadequate to relieve their suffering. With terminal sedation,
patients are sedated-sometimes to unconsciousness-so that they are no longer aware of their suf-
fering. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 41-50.
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. See, e.g., BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROB-
LEMS 1184 (3d ed. 1997) (observing that "the heavy betting odds" were that the Supreme Court
would reject a constitutional right to assisted suicide).
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dence that has seen little expansion 9 and significant contraction ° in recent
years, the Court was not likely to recognize a right that would break an im-
portant taboo in medicine. Moreover, recognizing a right to assisted sui-
cide would have required the Court to be far more activist than when it
recognized a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. By 1990, when the •
Court acknowledged the right to refuse treatment in Cruzan," fourteen
years had passed since the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in In re
Quinlan,12 the first right-to-die case. Such a long passage of time allowed
the Court to rely on the "laboratory" of state experimentation s in evaluat-
ing the implications of a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Moreo-
ver, by acknowledging a right to refuse treatment, but deferring to the
states on the procedural rules for withdrawing treatment from incompetent
persons, 14 the Cruzan decision simply ratified the existing body of state
9. The Court has recognized a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment in Cruzan v. Di-
rector, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (involving life-sustaining treatment)
and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (involving antipsychotic drugs), but has
generally rejected claims for new substantive due process rights in the past 10-15 years. See,
e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy).
10. The most important change in substantive due process law in the past decade was the
Court's narrowing of the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
in which the Court held that states could limit the right to abortion before viability as long as they
did so without imposing an undue burden on the exercise of the right.
11. The Court in Cruzan only assumed "for purposes of [the] case... that
the... Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Id at 279. However, in Glucksberg, the majority wrote that
in Cruzan, it not only had assumed but also "strongly suggested" that there is a constitutional
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. In any event, the lower
courts have read Cruzan as establishing a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
See, e.g., Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 10 (Fla. 1990) (citing Cruzan holding that "[a]
competent individual has the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment regardless of his or
her medical condition").
12. 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (permitting the withdrawal of a
respirator from a permanently unconscious woman).
13. The laboratory of state experimentation theme comes from New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ('It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.").
14. Although state courts before Cruzan had come to a consensus that competent adults en-
joyed a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and that the right survived when the patient lost
decision-making capacity, there was considerable variation among the states in terms of the stan-
dards that had to be satisfied before treatment could be withdrawn from an incompetent person.
Courts either looked to statements made by a patient while still competent, allowed the family to
decide based on its sense of what the patient would want. or tumed to the best interests of the pa-
tient. In addition, some states had different standards depending on the patient's condition and
the treatment at issue. For example, procedural rules were stricter for patients who were neither
terminally ill nor permanently unconscious. They were also stricter for removals of feeding tubes
than for removals of ventilators or other treatments. All of these approaches are permitted under
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law and practices that had been employed in hospitals throughout the
country for many years with wide public acceptance.' 5 Indeed, the.Cruzan
Court was able to recognize a constitutional right while upholding the
challenged state action.16 In contrast, recognition of a right to physician-
assisted suicide would have meant overturning bans on that practice in
more than forty states. In addition, because physician-assisted suicide
came to the Court relatively early in this country's experience with the
practice, 17 the Court could have found a right to assisted suicide only by
preempting state experimentation.' 8
Not only was the Court's rejection of a constitutional right predict-
able, so was its logic. The Court undertook its usual review of Anglo-
American legal tradition,19 found a tradition in which assisted suicide has
Cruzan. See generally David Orentlicher, The Right to Die After Cruzan, 264 JAMA 2444
(1990).
15. See generally id. It is not surprising that the Court was reflecting rather than changing
public sentiments. The Court has not often gotten too far out in front of the majority. SeeMi-
chael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. REV. 1,
7-18 (1996). The Court may have done somewhat more than simply ratify existing law. It may
have overridden a few very restrictive state court decisions, such as In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445,
451 (Wash. 1987) (en bane), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (1988), in which the court recognized a
right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, but denied a right for incompetent persons to have feed-
ing tubes withdrawn.
16. Although the Court assumed for purposes of its analysis that Nancy Cruzan had a right
to have her nutrition and hydration withdrawn, it upheld Missouri's imposition of a feeding tube
on the ground that the State could require clear and specific evidence of the patient's wishes be-
fore allowing the discontinuation of life-sustaining treatment. See 497 U.S. at 280-87. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court had concluded that there was insufficient evidence that Ms. Cruzan would
want to have food and water withheld. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424, 426 (Mo.
1988) (en banc).
17. To be sure, physicians probably have been assisting the suicides of their dying patients
for generations. However, such practices have been hidden from public scrutiny. The only pub-
lic experience with assisted suicide has been with Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a retired pathologist living
in Michigan, who has assisted dozens of suicides. See Brian Harmon, Kevorkian: I'll Put Law
on Trial: Suicide Advocate Says He'll Fight Attempts To Rein Him In, DErROrr NEWS, Jan. 1,
1998, at Cl.
For recent surveys documenting physician participation in assisted suicide, see generally
Diane E. Meier, et al., A National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the
United States, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1193 (1998); Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275
JAMA 919 (1996); Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide-Views of Physicians in
Oregon, 334 Nnw ENG. J. MED. 310 (1996).
18. As to why the Court granted certiorari rather than waiting for a period of state experi-
mentation to pass, it may have felt that the possibility of state experimentation had already been
preempted in large part by the Second Circuit in Quill and the Ninth Circuit in Glucksberg, both
recognizing a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
19. In his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "We begin, as we do in all due-process
cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices." Glucksberg, 117 S. CL
at 2262.
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been illegal,20 and concluded that it therefore had an insufficient basis for
subjecting prohibitions of assisted suicide to heightened scrutiny.21 Ac-
cordingly, the Court applied rational basis review. Under rational basis
review, laws banning assisted suicide easily pass muster. As the Court ob-
served, there are important risks of abuse associated with assisted suicide:
patients choosing suicide may be depressed or coerced, and society may
undervalue the lives of the terminally ill, disabled, and elderly.23 A state's
prohibition of assisted suicide is rationally related to preventing these po-
tential abuses.2 4
The Court's opinion becomes most interesting, I think, in its response
to the concern about patient suffering. In attempting to address the needs
of suffering patients, the Court devel6ps a doctrine that fails to maintain a
distinction in the law between treatment withdrawal and euthanasia. To
illustrate this, I now turn to an analysis of the Solicitor General's amicus
brief in Glucksberg and the responses by the Court to the Solicitor Gen-
eral's argument.
A. The Solicitor General's Brief in Glucksberg
25
Rather than drawing on Cruzan to argue for a right to choose the cir-
cumstances of one's death or on Planned Parenthood v. Case?6 to argue
20. See fit at 2262-67.
21. See id. at 2269.
22. See id. at 2271. To survive rational basis review, a law need serve only a "legitimate"
state interest. In addition, there need only be a plausible basis for believing that the law will
serve the state's interest. Stricter standards of review require an "important' or "compelling"
state interest and that the law be "substantially related" to the state's interest or be "narrowly
tailored" to serve the state's interest.
23. See id- at 2272-73.
24. See ia at 2272-75. See also, Cass Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YAI LJ. 1123,
1142-46 (1997). The rejection of the equal protection claim followed a similar path. In the ab-
sence of a due process right to assisted suicide, a state's distinction between treatment withdrawal
and assisted suicide need only satisfy rational basis review. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2297 n.5.
The Court cited several reasons for the distinction. For example, when life-sustaining treatment
is withdrawn, the Court said, the patient dies from the underlying disease. See id at 2298. In
contrast, with assisted suicide, the patient dies from a drug overdose. See ia Moreover, accord-
ing to the Court, while the physician may only intend to respect a patient's wishes to be free of
unwanted treatment when life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn, a physician assisting a suicide
must necessarily intend that the patient die. See iad at 2298-99.
25. More precisely, the brief was filed by the acting Solicitor General. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (reprinted on the web page of the University of Pennsylvania's
Center for Bioethics at http:/lwww.med.upenn.edul-bioethic/PAS). The Solicitor General also
filed a brief in Quill arguing that states can constitutionally distinguish between the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted suicide. See Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-1858)
(reprinted on the webpage of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Bioethics at
http:l/www.med.upenn.edu/-bioethic/PAS).
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for a right to make decisions about important personal matters, the Solici-
tor General argued for the existence of a Fourteenth Amendment right for
terminally ill persons to avoid both "severe physical pain" and "the despair
and distress that comes from physical deterioration and the inability to
control basic bodily and mental functions."27 The Solicitor General ob-
served that prior Supreme Court cases stood for the proposition that a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest is implicated "when the State itself
inflicts severe pain or suffering on someone."28 In addition, the Solicitor
General argued, a liberty interest is implicated when the state blocks a per-
son from seeking relief from severe pain or suffering.29 Thus, for example,
a state could not prevent a person with an illness causing extreme physical
pain from obtaining medications to alleviate the pain, nor could a state
prevent a person with severe mental depression from obtaining prescription
drugs to treat that condition. 0 As authority for this position, the Solicitor
General cited the discussion in Casey in which the Court justified a right to
abortion in part to ensure that women are not forced to endure the physical
and mental suffering that can accompany pregnancy.
3 1
B. The Court's Response to the Solicitor General
The Court's response to the Solicitor General is found in the concur-
ring opinions of Justices O'Connor and Breyer; the majority opinion did
26. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming, but narrowing, the right to abortion recognized in Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
27. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Washington
v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110).
28. Id (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (involving corporal punish-
ment of children in the schools) and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (involving
beating of an inmate by prison guards)).
29. See id at 15.
30. See id.
31. See id (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 852). Other parties also raised the interest of the dy-
ing patient in avoiding pain, but did so more in terms of explaining why the decision to end one's
life is an important personal decision that justifies constitutional protection. See, e.g., Brief of
Respondents at 13, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (reprinted
on the web page of the University of Pennsylvania's Center for Bioethics at http.//www.med.
upenn.edul-bioethic/PAS) (quoting Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en bane), revd, Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (observing that "few decisions
are more personal, intimate or important than the decision to end one's life, especially when the
reason for doing so is to avoid excessive and protracted pain.")).
Although the Solicitor General argued in favor of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
in assisted suicide, he also concluded that states should be able to prohibit assisted suicides en-
tirely. See id at 19-32. In the opinion of the Solicitor General, states could decide that opening
the door to assisted suicide for terminally ill persons would pose too great a risk of suicide for
persons who are not competent, who are not terminally ill, whose desire for suicide would abate
with treatment for mental depression or with validation from others of the value of their life, or
who are vulnerable to influence by family members and physicians concerned with the financial
and psychological burdens of caring for the patient. See id at 20-28.
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not explicitly address the Solicitor General's argument. In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that "there
is no generalized right to 'commit suicide.' 32 However, she noted, the re-
spondents had argued a narrower point-that terminally ill persons who
are suffering greatly should be able to choose assisted suicide in order to
gain relief from their suffering? 3 Rather than deciding whether this nar-
rower right exists, Justice O'Connor observed that, even if such a right did
exist, a prohibition on assisted suicide would not violate the right? 4 Dying
patients who are experiencing great pain have "no legal barriers to obtain-
ing medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even
to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death."35 Justice
O'Connor's opinion was joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer.3 6
In his separate concurrence, Justice Breyer echoed Justice
O'Connor's argument. In his view, there is arguably a "'right to die with
dignity,"' which includes as one of its core aspects a right to avoid "unnec-
essary and severe physical suffering."37 According to Justice Breyer, how-
ever, that right does not justify assisted suicide. A successful claim to as-
sisted suicide would require a showing of a need to avoid "severe physical
pain," and any physical pain can be avoided with either pain control medi-
cations or "sedation which can end in a coma."
38
For purposes of my argument, the key point made by Justices
O'Connor and Breyer, and joined by Justice Ginsburg,3 9 is the rejection of
a right to assisted suicide on the ground that treatment is available to re-
32. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. See ia
34. See id
35. Id. (emphasis added). The American Medical Association (AMA) assured the Court
that this was the case. According to the AMA's amicus brief:
The pain of most terminally ill patients can be controlled throughout the dying process
without heavy sedation or anesthesia. For a very few patients, however, sedation to a
sleep-like state may be necessary in the last days or weeks of life to prevent the patient
from experiencing severe pain.
Brief of the American Medical Association et al., as Amid Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (No. 96-110) (citations omitted).
36. More precisely, Justice Ginsburg concurred "in the Court's judgments substantially for
the reasons stated in" Justice O'Connor's concurrence, and Justice Breyer joined Justice
O'Connor "except insofar as [her opinion] join[ed] the opinions of the Court." Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2303 n.*.
37. Id. at2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
38. Id. at2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
39. While Justices Stevens and Souter did not discuss whether there is a constitutional right
to obtain relief from severe suffering, their opinions suggest they would be sympathetic to that
view. See id at 2291 n.16 (Souter, J., concurring) (observing that there are important reasons for
distinguishing assisted suicide from both aggressive pain control and the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment); id at 2308 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "[e]ncouraging the devel-
opment and ensuring the availability of adequate pain treatment is of utmost importance").
lieve the suffering of any dying patient, with the most severe suffering
avoided by sedating the patient into unconsciousness or even coma 0 By
relying on the availability of such heavy sedation, the Justices rejected as-
sisted suicide only by embracing euthanasia 1
11. Terminal Sedation
When Justice O'Connor wrote about palliative care causing uncon-
sciousness, and Justice Breyer wrote about physicians sedating patients
into a coma, they were referring to the same practice, a practice commonly
characterized as "terminal sedation." A description of terminal sedation
follows.
At the end stage of life, terminally ill patients may develop intolerable
symptoms of pain, shortness of breath, agitated delirium or persistent
vomiting that are refractory to the usual therapies 2 Intolerable pain may
be caused by a number of conditions, including cancer that has spread to
the spine with collapse of the vertebral bodies, intestinal obstruction, 6r
severe headache due to massive intra-cerebral edema (i.e., massive build-
up of fluid in the brain).43 Intolerable shortness of breath also may be
caused by a number of conditions, including emphysema, lung and other
40. All patients in a coma are unconscious, but not all unconscious patients are in a coma.
In a coma, there is loss of fimction of the part of the brain that is responsible for consciousness.
There is also loss of function of parts of the brain that are responsible for breathing, sleep-wake
cycles, reflexes and other unconscious activity. Accordingly, coma is sometimes described as a
deep unconscious state. Brain death is even firther along the spectrum of loss of brain fmction.
In brain death, there is a nearly total loss of unconscious brain function in addition to the loss of
consciousness.
41. Although the majority opinion in Glucksberg did not explicitly address the Solicitor
General's argument that the right at stake is the right to avoid suffering, the Court did signal its
approval of sedation, even into coma, in Quill. There, the majority rejected the claim that such
heavy sedation "is covert physician-assisted suicide." Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2301 n.1 1. The effect
of the Court's opinions in Glucksberg and Quill has been to give a green light to physicians who
address their patients' suffering by deeply sedating them. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Cries of
the Dying Awaken Doctor to a New Approach, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1997, at Al (noting "the
Supreme Court put its imprimatur on th[e] practice" of aggressive palliative care, even though it
"might hasten a patient's death," as long as "the intent is only to ease pain").
42. See Nathan I. Cherry & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management ofRefractory
Symptoms: Guidelines for Evaluation and Treatment, 10(2) 3. PALLIATIVE CARE 31 (1994);
William R. Greene & William H. Davis, Titrated Intravenous Barbiturates in the Control of
Symptoms in Patients with Terminal Cancer, 84 S. MED. L 332 (1991); Timothy E. Quill &
Robert V. Brody, "You Promised Me I Wouldn't Die Like This!": A Bad Death as a Medical
Emergency, 155 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 1250 (1995); Subha Ramani & Anand B. Karnad, Long-
Term Subcutaneous infrsion of Midazolam for Refractory Delirium in Terminal Breast Cancer,
89 S. MED. 3. 1101 (1996).
43. See Chemy & Portenoy, supra note 42, at 32.
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cancers, and congestive heart falure. In cases of intolerable and refrac-
tory suffering, adequate relief can be obtained only by sedating the pa-
tients, often into unconsciousness, so that they no longer are able to feel
their pain or other suffering4 5 Although the frequency of intolerable and
refractory symptoms is uncertain, studies have found their existence in 10-
50% of terminally ill patients referred for palliative care4 6
With terminal sedation, narcotics (e.g., morphine), benzodiazepine
sedative drugs (e.g., Valium), barbiturates (e.g., amobarbital) and/or major
tranquilizing drugs (e.g., Haldol or Thorazine) are used to sedate the pa-
tient. The sedation is maintained until the patient dies, usually within a
few days, either from the underlying terminal illness, or from a second step
that is often part of terminal sedation-the withholding of nutrition and
hydration.48 Because the sedation leaves the patient with a depressed level
of consciousness and stopping the sedation would only result in the patient
reexperiencing the suffering, the patient frequently agrees to have food and
water withheld rather than having life prolonged for a short time. In cases
in which terminal sedation shortens the patient's life, it usually does so by
hours or days. For some patients, however, life is shortened by as much as
several weeks.
49
At first glance, terminal sedation seems consistent with well accepted
practices. It is appropriate for physicians to treat the pain and suffering of
patients aggressively, even if doing so increases the likelihood that a pa-
tient will die. It is also appropriate for patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, including food and water. Upon closer examination, however,
terminal sedation is at times essentially "slow euthanasia."50
44. See David B. Reuben & Vincent Mor, Dyspnea in Terminally Ill Cancer Patients, 89
CHEST 234 (1986).
45. See, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
46. See Cherry & Portenoy, supra note 42, at 32; see also ROBERT E. ENcK, THE MEDICAL
CARE oFTERMINALLY ILLPATENTS 166-72(1994). Because patients referred for palliative care
are a minority of all dying patients, the number of patients receiving terminal sedation is rela-
tively small.
47. See Chery & Portenoy, supra note 42, at 35; Robert D. Truog et al., Barbiturates in the
Care ofthe Terminally fl, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1992).
48. See Timothy E. Quill, et al., Palliative Options of Last Resort: A Comparison of Vol-
untarily Stopping Eating and Drinking, Terminal Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and
VoluntaryActive Euthanasia, 278 JAMA 2099,2100 (1997).
49. See id.
50. It is "slow" euthanasia because the patient dies after a few hours or days rather than al-
most immediately. The term slow euthanasia has previously been used to describe other forms of
euthanasia. See, e.g., . Andrew Billings & Susan D. Block, Slow Euthanasia, 12(4) .
PALLIATIVE CARE 21 (1996) (using "slow euthanasia" to refer to the practice of increasing the
dose of palliative medications "not for the purpose of easing identifiable discomfort but with the
expectation of hastening death gradually").
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1II. Terminal Sedation as a Form of Euthanasia
In many cases, terminal sedation amounts to euthanasia because the
sedated patient often dies from the combination of two intentional acts by
the physician-the induction of stupor or unconsciousness and the with-
holding of food and water.51 Without these two acts, the patient would live
longer before eventually succumbing to illness 2 In other words, if the se-
dation step and the withholding of nutrition and hydration step are viewed
as a total package, we have a situation in which a patient's life is ended by
the active intervention of a physician.
It might be argued that these deaths by terminal sedation are not
deaths by euthanasia because they result from the withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration. As courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
consistently recognized, it is ethically and legally permissible for patients
to die because artificial nutrition and hydration have been discontinued.53
Although terminal sedation deaths from dehydration or starvation ap-
pear in form to be a type of treatment withdrawal, in principle, they are
more like a variation of euthanasia. We permit the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment, but reject assisted suicide and euthanasia because, as
the Quill Court argued, the patient dies from the underlying digease, not
from the active intervention of the physician.5 4 The patient's illness is al-
51. It is true that the withholding of food and water is an "omission" and therefore a differ-
ent kind of action than an injection of a drug, and it is also true that the law often distinguishes
"acts" from "omissions." Nevertheless, as Justice Scalia has observed, the line between appro-
priate and inappropriate patient deaths is not defined simply by the distinction between action and
inaction. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that if"one may not kill
oneself by walking into the sea," then one may also not "sit on the beach until submerged by the
incoming tide"). See also Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance,
105 HARV. L. REV. 2021, 2028-29 (1992) (observing that the distinction between acts and omis-
sions is not always clear and that the act-omission distinction does not coincide with the moral-
immoral distinction).
Moreover, ethicists have long argued that withholdings are worse than withdrawals since
treatment withdrawals at least come after a trial of the therapy while withholdings deny the
chance for an unexpected recovery.
52. Although the patient's life may be shortened by only hours, days or weeks, this does not
affect the determination of whether the death is caused by euthanasia. Shooting people on their
deathbeds is still murder.
53. See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990)
(permitting the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a woman with severe brain damage following a
stroke); In re lobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (permitting the withdrawal of a feeding tube from
a 'woman in a persistent vegetative state); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626
(Mass. 1986) (permitting the withdrawal of a feeding tube from a man in a persistent vegetative
state).
54. According to the Court in Quill, "When a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, he dies from an underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medi-
cation prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication." 117 S. Ct. at 2298. While I
have discussed my problems with this distinction, see David Orentlicher, The Legalization of
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lowed to take its natural course 5 Patients with severe emphysema die af-
ter the removal of their ventilators because their lung disease has made
them unable to breathe. Similarly, a patient in a persistent vegetative state
dies after the removal of a feeding tube because the patient's brain damage
has rendered the patient unable to eat food or drink fluids. This is not,
however, what happens with terminal sedation accompanied by the with-
holding of nutrition and hydration. In such a case, the patient dies from the
induced stupor or coma. It is the physician-created state of diminished
consciousness that is responsible for the patient's inability to eat, not the
natural progression of the patient's underlying disease.
Proponents of terminal sedation might defend the practice by citing
the principle of double effect. Under that principle, physicians may take
steps that might hasten a patient's death, as long as the steps are a reason-
able effort to treat the patient's suffering and the patient's death is not in-
tended. 6 For example, it is permissible to give analgesics or sedatives to
alleviate a patient's pain, even if the drugs might halt the patient's breath-
ing. The principle of double effect, however, only justifies the sedation
part of terminal sedation. We cannot justify the withdrawal of food and
water component of terminal sedation, because that step does nothing to
relieve the patient's suffering, but rather serves only to bring on the pa-
tient's death. If it is argued that the withdrawal of food and water is a
permissible act, then we are back to the previous response that the reason it
is permissible is that the patient's inability to eat or drink results from an
underlying disease.
A third potential basis for distinguishing terminal sedation from
euthanasia, the physician's intent, also fails. The physician's intent is
morally equivalent for terminal sedation and euthanasia. As the Quill
Court observed, considerations of intent are commonly invoked to explain
the distinction between treatment withdrawal and assisted suicide or
euthanasia. 57 According to the Court, a physician who withdraws life-
sustaining treatment may only intend to free the patient of an undesired
treatment, while a physician assisting a patient's suicide must necessarily
Physician-Assisted Suicide, A Very Modest Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REv. 443,447-49 (1997), my
purpose is to show that, even if we accept the distinction, terminal sedation amounts to euthana-
sia.
55. Cf. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 589 (ILL 1988) (observing in a case involving the
removal of a feeding tube firm a woman who was permanently unconscious from a cerebral
hemorrhage that "there is an obvious distinction between deliberately ending a life by artificial
means and allowing nature to take its course"); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.L 1985)
(stating in a case involving the treatment of a bedridden woman with severe dementia that
"frefusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course").
56. See TOM L. BFAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDREss, PNCImLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
206-11 (4th ed. 1994).
57. Quill, 117 S. Ct. at2298-99.
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intend the patient's death. 8 Indeed, the Court observed, the law commonly
uses the intent of the actor "to distinguish between two acts that may have
the same result."59 The difference, in short, is between the person who acts
"'because of' a given end" and the person who acts "'in spite of ... unin-
tended but foreseen consequences."
These points about intent place terminal sedation in the category of
euthanasia rather than withdrawal of treatment. As the Quill Court sug-
gested, there are two components to the issue of intent-the subjective
motivation or purpose of the actor, and objective considerations like the
knowledge of the actor and the consequences of the action.6' In terms of
the subjective component of intent, we cannot distinguish terminal seda-
tion from euthanasia. Indeed, we cannot distinguish among withdrawal of
treatment, terminal sedation, assisted suicide or euthanasia. With all four,
the physician acts with a morally acceptable, indeed morally praiseworthy,
purpose: to relieve the patient's suffering and/or to free the patient of un-
wanted treatment.62
Although treatment withdrawal is typically distinguished from eutha-
nasia in terms of the objective component of intent, terminal sedation and
euthanasia cannot be differentiated on that basis. Treatment withdrawal is
distinguished from euthanasia because with the former, the physician
might reasonably believe that the patient will survive the discontinuation
of treatment. The physician may have misjudged either the patient's de-
pendence on the treatment,63 or the chances that the patient's condition
would improve." Because it is possible for treatment to be withdrawn and
for the patient to survive, we can say that the physician only intends to free
58. See id.
59. IaM at 2299.
60. Id. The Court overstated its point. With most crimes, liability is imposed whether the
defendant desired the result or merely acted with the knowledge that the result would occur. See
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980). In addition, even when the defendant's pur-
pose or motivation is relevant, it usually affects only the degree of the crime and the severity of
the punishment, not whether a crime has been committed. See id at 405. Thus, the law often'
holds people responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their acts, even if they had no desire
to cause those consequences. See i d at 404; W. PAGE KEEoN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ONTHELAWOF TORTs 280-300 (5th ed. 1984). Typically, itis relevant whether the person acted
with knowledge that the action would cause the results that occurred. See WAYNE .LAFAVE &
AusnN W. ScoTr JR., SUBSTANTv CRImNAL LAW 305-309 (1986).
61. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 60, at 302-09.
62. See Glucksberg, 117 S.CL at 2310 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that, with either
treatment withdrawl, terminal sedation, or assisted suicide, the "physician may seek simply to
ease the patient's suffering and to comply with her wishes").
63. For example, the patient thought to be dependent on a ventilator for breathing may turn
out to be able to breathe without a ventilator.
64. For example, the patient who is unable to eat or drink without a feeding tube may re-
cover enough to start eating and drinking again.
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the patient from an unwanted treatment. We cannot make a parallel argu-
ment for euthanasia. Because euthanasia will relieve the patient's suffer-
ing only by killing the patient, the physician cannot reasonably intend that
the patient not die. In terms of this distinction between treatment with-
drawal and euthanasia, terminal sedation falls on the euthanasia side of the
line. Just as a physician performing euthanasia must necessarily intend the
patient's death, because the patient will certainly die,65 so must a physician
providing terminal sedation intend the patient's death when the sedation is
accompanied by the withholding of nutrition and hydration. Because no
one can survive very long without sustenance, the withholding of food and
water will inevitably cause the patient's death. In other words, there is no
possibility that the physician has misjudged the patient's dependence on
the treatment. Moreover, the sedation precludes the possibility of patient
survival from a mistaken prognosis. Even if there is an improvement in the
patient's underlying condition, the sedation will prevent the patient from
starting to eat or drink.66 Accordingly, if the physician's intent is the key,
terminal sedation is still more like euthanasia than like withdrawal of
treatment.
A fourth ground might also be used to distinguish terminal sedation
from euthanasia: although terminal sedation may sometimes be euthanasia
in form, it arguably is not euthanasia in substance. Physicians use terminal
sedation to respond to the intolerable suffering of dying patients. Euthana-
sia, on the other hand, may be used to end the lives of disabled patients,
without their consent. This argument for terminal sedation, however, is
exactly the argument used by proponents of assisted suicide before the Su-
preme Court. In their view, assisted suicide should be permitted as long as
65. The Court, like many commentators, mistakenly believes that with assisted suicide, the
physician also must necessarily intend the patient's death. See Quill, 117 S. Ct. at 2299. In fact,
a physician assisting a patient's suicide need not intend the patient's death. Many patients who
receive a lethal supply of a drug never use it. See Meier et a]., supra note 17, at 1195 (finding
that 41% of patients who received a prescription from their physician for assisted suicide did not
use the prescription). Knowing this, the physician might hope that writing the prescription for an
overdose of barbiturates will relieve the patient's desire for death. Often, patients seeking suicide
are primarily trying to assert control over their lives at a time when they are being controlled by
their disease and their health care providers. See Daniel W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia,
22(2) HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 10, 11, 15 (1992). Having the prescription or the bottle of pills in
a bedside drawer can transfer enough control back to the patient for the patient to be willing to
continue living. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, su-
pra note 51, at 2026.
66. This fact distinguishes the terminally sedated patient from other patients, like Nancy
Cruzan, whose feeding tubes are withheld. In theory, it was possible for Ms. Cruzan to recover
her ability to eat and drink after her feeding tube was removed.
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physicians use it only to respond to the intolerable suffering of dying pa-
tients. 6
7
Finally, it might be asserted that with terminal sedation, the patient's
death is actually the result of the underlying disease, rather than the physi-
cian's action. According to this argument, it is the patient's illness that
creates the need for the sedation. The underlying disease is responsible for
the patient's suffering and for the patient's request for palliative care. But
this same logic would also justify euthanasia and assisted suicide. With
euthanasia or assisted suicide, it is the patient's underlying disease that
causes the patient to ask for a life-ending drug.68
IV. Terminal Sedation vs. Assisted Suicide
Terminal sedation is not only a type of euthanasia, it is also ethically
more problematic than either assisted suicide or euthanasia. With respect
to euthanasia, terminal sedation poses the same risks of abuse while serv-
ing fewer purposes of right-to-die law. Compared with assisted suicide,
terminal sedation poses even greater risks of abuse and serves fewer pur-
poses of right-to-die law.
Terminal sedation serves fewer purposes of right-to-die law than ei-
ther assisted suicide or euthanasia for several reasons. A patient's right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment is recognized in large part because of the
pain and suffering caused by the patient's illness. With respect to this pain
and suffering, terminal sedation provides the same relief as assisted suicide
or euthanasia. The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, however, re-
sponds to other concerns of dying patients. These other concerns are met
67. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct 2258 (1997)
(No. 9,6-110). Another response to this purported distinction between terminal sedation and
euthanasia is that terminal sedation can also be used to end the lives of patients without their con-
sent. See infra text accompanying note 83.
68. Still, some might say, if terminal sedation is euthanasia, then so are many other with-
drawals of treatment that we would not want to consider euthanasia. Suppose, for example, that a
patient undergoes surgery for coronary artery disease and during surgery suffers a stroke that
leaves the patient mentally incompetent and dependent on a ventilator. Suppose further that the
patient had given instructions that, in the event of irreversible incompetence, treatment with a
ventilator was not wanted. If the patient's ventilator were then withdrawn, it would be odd to say
that the withdrawal constituted euthanasia because the patient's inability to breathe was not the
natural result of his underlying disease, but was the result of the surgical intervention of his phy-
sician.
We can characterize terminal sedation as euthanasia without being forced to characterize
other withdrawals of treatment as euthanasia. In my example of the surgically-induced inability
to breathe, the patient's stroke is at least as much a consequence of the patient's underlying ill-
ness as a consequence of the surgical intervention. More impoftantly, the surgeon does not intend
to render the patient unable to breathe. In contrast, with terminal sedation, the physician acts in-
tentionally to render the patient unconscious.
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by assisted suicide and euthanasia, but not by terminal sedation. Patients
who undergo terminal sedation are required to accept a dying process that
is prolonged relative to the dying process with assisted suicide or euthana-
sia. Terminal sedation thereby forces patients to linger in a state that they
may feel is profoundly compromising of their dignity, that further distorts
the memory they leave behind, and that means a drawn-out and debilitating
process for family members.6 9 Terminal sedation also prevents patients
from retaining a sense of control over the timing and circumstances of their
death, a factor that may be critical to the psychological well-being of dying
patients. Dying patients have little control over their lives. Critical mat-
ters will be determined almost entirely by their disease: How much longer
they will live; where they will spend the remaining days or months of their
lives; how many of their routine activities they will be able to manage by
themselves; and how much discomfort they will have. In addition, if they
are in a hospital or other institution, their schedules will be determined in
large part by the needs of their health care providers. The option of as-
sisted suicide gives patients more control because they ultimately decide
when they will die.70 In sum, terminal sedation is as beneficial to patients
as assisted suicide or euthanasia in terms of relieving physical pain and
distress, but it is less beneficial in terms of the other concerns that patients
have about their deaths.
To see how terminal sedation raises the same risks of abuse as as-
sisted suicide or euthanasia, consider the following twist on the Janet Ad-
kins case. Janet Adkins was the woman who became the first person to die
with the assistance of Dr. Jack Kevorkian.71 Ms. Adkins was a 54-year-old
woman from Portland, Oregon who was experiencing early symptoms of
Alzheimer's disease.72 She apparently tried several experimental therapies
69. Cf Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 310-312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('Tor many, the thought of an
ignoble end, steeped in decay, is abhorrent.... A long, drawn-out death can have a debilitating
effect on family members.... For some, the idea of being remembered in their persistent vege-
tative state rather than as they were before their illness or accident may be very disturbing.");
James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. . MED. (1975) (observing that
euthanasia is preferable to withdrawal oftreatment since it minimizes the suffering of the patient,
and the relief of suffering is what prompts a decision to withdraw treatment).
On the other hand, for some patients and families, a longer dying process may be desired.
See Ira R. Byocl, Consciously Walking the Fine Line: Thoughts on a Hospice Response to As-
sisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 9(3) . PALLIATIVE CARE 25, 27-28 (1993) (discussing the bene-
fits of the dying process for patients and their families). Nevertheless, that is only an argument
for allowing patients to choose whether to prolong their death.
70. See Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted'Suicide, 20 L. MD. & HEALTH
CARE 116, 123-124 (1992).
71. See Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y. TWMS,
June 6, 1990, at Al.
72. See id. atB6.
unsuccessfully, and then turned to Dr. Kevorkian for assistance in sui-
cide.73 In June 1990, she ended her life with the help of Dr. Kevorkian. 4
Now, suppose that when Ms. Adkins expressed her despair to her personal
physician and her desire to obtain Dr. Kevorkian's assistance, the physi-
cian suggested that she consider instead terminal sedation accompanied by
the withholding of nutrition and hydration. If we are troubled by Ms. Ad-
kins' suicide at the hands -of Dr. Kevorkian, then we should be equally
troubled by the idea of terminal sedation at the hands of her personal phy-
sician. In both cases, Ms. Adkins would have died, despite not being ter-
minally ill. In both cases, Ms. Adkins might have chosen to end her life
because her mental competence was compromised by her Alzheimer's dis-
ease or by a depression that would have responded to psychiatric therapy. 5
In both cases, Ms. Adkins might have been pushed to end her life by her
family or her physician because of their concerns about the costs of her
care or the emotional burdens of caring for her.76 In both cases, Ms. Ad-
kins might have chosen to end her life because she did not receive appro-
priate palliative care for her suffering. 7 Finally, in both cases, Ms. Akins
might have been mistakenly diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease.78
If we look at the other concerns about legalizing assisted suicide or
euthanasia, we see that they apply in the same way to terminal sedation. If
physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia would "undermine the trust that is
essential to the doctor-patient relationship" because physicians would be
causers of death as well as healers of illness,79 then the practice of terminal
73. See id.
74. See ia atAl.
75. If, as the Glucksberg Court opined, legalizing physician-assisted suicide "could make it
more difficult for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons... from suicidal im-
pulses," 117 S. Ct. at 2273, then so could the legalization of terminal sedation.
76. Cf. Yale Kamisar, Are Laws against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23(3)
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 39 (1993) (raising these concerns as an argument against physician-
assisted suicide). See also MARGARET PABST BATrIN, ETICAL ISSUES IN SUICIDE 215-18
(1995) (acknowledging these concerns with assisted suicide but concluding that they can be ad-
dressed through regulation rather than prohibition).
77. Cf. Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Lfe? 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 531-32 (1995) (raising this concern as an argument against physi-
cian-assisted suicide).
78. We might distinguish terminal sedation with Ms. Adkins' Portland physician from as-
sisted suicide with Dr. Kevorkian on the ground that Ms. Adkins had a long-standing relationship
with her Portland physician. However, we can overcome that distinction by changing the hypo-
thetical to involve a comparison between terminal sedation by the Portland physician and assisted
suicide by the Portland physician.
79. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273. For other arguments making this point, see Leon Kass,
Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 PUBLIC INTEES 25, 35 (Winter
1989) and Seth F. Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe, Casey,
and the Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 803, 829 (1995).
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sedation will alsb undermine patient trust. With terminal sedation, the
physician is also hastening death rather than healing disease.
Commentators observe that physician assisted suicide is also danger-
ous because physicians undervalue the lives of persons who are terminally
ill, elderly, or disabled. Therefore, they argue, a physician is less likely to
question suicidal impulses when the patient is terminally ill, elderly, or
disabled rather than young and healthy.80 Terminal sedation, however, is
similarly dangerous. When deciding whether to provide terminal sedation
to a terminally ill, elderly, or disabled person, undervaluation of the per-
son's life will make the physician more likely to provide the sedation than
if the patient is a young, healthy person. Finally, if a right to assisted sui-
cide for the terminally ill must inevitably lead society down the slippery
slope to assisted suicide for patients who are not terminally ill,"1 then ter-
minal sedation for the terminally ill will also inevitably lead to terminal
sedation for patients who are not terminally ill. 2 All of the risks of abuse
that exist for assisted suicide or euthanasia also exist for terminal sedation.
Terminal sedation also shares a serious risk with euthanasia that goes
beyond the risks associated with assisted suicide. While it is not possible
to coerce unconscious or severely demented persons to commit suicide, 3 it
is a simple matter to terminally sedate, or perform euthanasia on, any in-
competent person without the person's consent or even the person's
knowledge. The death-causing act of assisted suicide is much more under
the control of the patient than are the death-causing acts of terminal seda-
tion and etithanasia.
In sum, when it comes to the issues that really count in determining
the morality of a death-causing act by physicians-whether the act serves
the purposes of right-to-die law and whether the act threatens patient wel-
fare--terminal sedation is a worse alternative than either euthanasia or as-
sisted suicide.
The Court's preference for terminal sedation over assisted suicide is
puzzling. Not only is terminal sedation akin to euthanasia, a practice gen-
erally considered less acceptable than assisted suicide,4 it ultimately
80. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
81. -See i at 2274.
82. Similarly, if it is not feasible to limit assisted suicide to the terminally ill because physi-
cians cannot define terminal illness with sufficient precision, see Thomas . Marzen, "Out, Out
Brief Candle": Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally I11, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 799, 814-815 (1994), it is also not feasible to limit terminal sedation to the terminally ill.
83. These persons are unable to take pills themselves. See Marcia Angell, The Supreme
Court andPhysician-AssistedSuicide: The Ultimate Right 336 NEWENG. . MED. 50 (1997).
84. See, e.g., Sidney IL Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility TowardHelplessly Ill
Patients: A Second Look, 30 NEW ENG. . MED 844, 848 (1989) (observing that euthanasia is
leaves patients with an option that is ethically more problematic than the
rejected practice of assisted suicide. Accordingly, the Court has preserved
the distinction between treatment withdrawal and assisted suicide only by
creating a constitutional scheme that is inferior to a regime in which there
is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
Note the irony here. The Supreme Court rejected a right to assisted
suicide in large part because of the risks that it poses.85 Yet, by sanction-
ing terminal sedation-a practice with greater risks-the Court implicitly
took the view that the risks of legalizing physician-assisted suicide can be
sufficiently minimized. In other words, the Court must have concluded
that physicians can be trusted to offer terminal sedation in appropriate
situations without offering it in all situations. More specifically, the Court
must have concluded that physicians will reserve terminal sedation accom-
panied by the withholding of nutrition and hydration for patients who meet
certain criteria, such as terminal illness or intolerable suffering.
8 6
Once the Court has accepted the idea that terminal sedation can be
used and reserved for only appropriate situations, despite its being a form
of euthanasia, the Court has undermined one of its own critical arguments
against physician-assisted suicide (or euthanasia). Many opponents of as-
sisted suicide concede that it is morally acceptable in some circumstances,
such as for the person who is suffering severe and intractable pain and who
will die shortly from metastatic cancer. These opponents argue, however,
that it is not possible to limit assisted suicide to only the morally accept-
able cases. Once we permit assisted suicide for some persons, we will
have no principle for denying it to other persons who claim great suffer-
ing.87 The Glucksberg Court made the same argument.88 Yet, if physicians
can limit terminal sedation to appropriate cases, then they could limit as-
sisted suicide in the same way. By whatever criteria physicians employ to
decide when terminal sedation is appropriate therapy, they could also de-
cide when assisted suicide is appropriate therapy.
"even more controversial" than assisted suicide because it "requires the physician to perform a
medical procedure that causes death directly").
85. See Glucksberg, 117S. Ct. at 2272-75.
86. This conclusion distinguishes terminal sedation from withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment, a practice that we are willing to permit for all persons.
87. See Daniel Callahan, When Self-Determination Runs Amok, 22(2) HASTRNGS CENTER
REP. 52 (1992); Yale Kamisar, Against AssistedSuicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCYL. REV. 735 (1995).
88. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274 (recognizing that "the State may fear that permitting as-
sisted suicide will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia?').
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V. Explaining the Court's Reasoning
If terminal sedation essentially amounts to euthanasia in many cases,
and if terminal sedation is more problematic ethically than assisted suicide,
why did three Supreme Court Justices explicitly endorse the practice while
rejecting assisted suicide, and why did the other Justices signal their ap-
proval of terminal sedation?89 Might the Justices have misunderstood how
terminal sedation actually works? This explanation is unlikely; the law-
yers for the patients and physicians seeking recognition of a right to as-
sisted suicide called the Court's attention to the similarities between termi-
nal sedation and assisted suicide in both their briefs90 and their oral
arguments. 9!'
In explaining the Court's decisions, there are two issues to be ad-
dressed: (1) Why would the Court endorse a practice that is essentially
euthanasia? (2) Why would the Court reject the ethically superior alterna-
tive of assisted suicide?
I believe there are two parts to answering this question of why the
Court would endorse a form of euthanasia. First, the Court's decision sug-
gests that it cares more about why a patient wishes to die than how the pa-
tient dies. In endorsing terminal sedation despite the fact that at times it
amounts to euthanasia, the Court is essentially saying that the right to die
primarily reflects a moral sentiment that people who are dying and suffer-
ing intolerably should be allowed to die even if they cannot do so simply
by refusing life-sustaining treatment.9 2 In this view, it is more acceptable
for a person who is suffering severe pain and who will die within a few
days to receive terminal sedation than for a young, healthy person to refuse
a ventilator when artificial ventilation is needed for only a few days as part
of the treatment for a curable pneumonia.93
The second part of the explanation for the Court's acceptance of ter-
minal sedation is that the Court saw a right to terminal sedation as neces-
89. See supra notes 39 and 41 for discussion of the other six justices' implicit support of
terminal sedation.
90. See Brief of Respondents at 21-22 Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997)
(No. 96-110); Brief of Respondents at 48-50, Quill v. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997) (No. 95-
1858).
91. See Arguments Before The Court: Health Care, 65 U.S. L. WKLY. 3481, 3483 (Jan. 14,
1997) (reporting that Justice Ginsburg at oral argument "questioned whether there is a rational
distinction between such 'terminal sedation' and administration of a lethal pill"). Indeed, the
Court discussed the distinction between terminal sedation and assisted suicide in its opinion in
Quill. 117 S. Ct. at 2301 n.l.
92. See David Orentiicher, The Legalization of Physician Assisted Suicide: A Very Modest
Revolution, 38 B.C. L. REV. 443, 462-71 (1997); David Orentlicher, The Legalization of Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 663 (1996).
93. See id.
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sary to preserve a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Con-
sider the following example: After being diagnosed with cancer and told
to expect to live only another year or two, a patient writes a living will
stating that, in the event of incompetence and imminent death, all life-
sustaining treatment should be withdrawn. Several months later, the can-
cer is widely metastatic with death expected in a few weeks, and the pa-
tient is suffering from severe pain that cannot be relieved by analgesics.
The patient's physician discusses the possibility of terminal sedation for
the pain, and the patient agrees. The patient then reminds the physician of
the living will and solicits a promise that the physician will carry out the
instructions in the will. This would mean that, once the sedation left the
patient incompetent, all life-sustaining treatment would be withdrawn or
withheld. However, if the prohibition of euthanasia meant that patients re-
ceiving terminal sedation could not have food and water withheld, then the
physician would have to refuse the patient's request. Patients like this hy-
pothetical patient would have to choose between obtaining relief from their
suffering or retaining their right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. This is
a choice that people should not have to make.94 Even for patients who
have not already considered whether they wish to have life-sustaining
treatment withheld when they ask for or agree to terminal sedation, it is
still a problem if their physicians must tell them to choose between gaining
relief for their suffering and exercising their right to refuse a fdeding tube.
Although we have a good explanation for the Court's decision to ac-
cept terminal sedation despite the fact that it is a form of euthanasia, we
are still left with the question why the Court would reject the ethically
better alternative to terminal sedation of assisted suicide. Assisted suicide
looks very different in a world with terminal sedation than in one without
94. The Court has been concerned about forcing people to make "Hobson's choices" in
other contexts. For example, in Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court invalidated certain residency re-
quirements for voting in state elections on the ground that the requirements forced people to
choose between their right to travel and their right to vote. 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972). Similarly,
the Court has held in several cases that individuals cannot be penalized for exercising their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964)
(individual cannot be held in contempt of court for invoking Fifth Amendment); Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (lawyer cannot be disbarred for invoking the Fifth Amendment in
professional disciplinary hearing); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (policeman cannot
be fired for invoking the Fifth Amendment even when being questioned with regard to official
duties). This unfair choice problem is similar to, although stronger than, an unconstitutional con-
ditions case in which the government conditions a benefit on the waiving of a constitutional right.
For discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitu-
tional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine Is an Anachronism (with Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and
Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
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terminal sedation. Once terminal sedation is available, permitting assisted
suicide reduces, rather than increases, the risks of patient abuse.9 5
The Court's decision to reject assisted suicide despite its acceptance
of terminal sedation appears to reflect considerations of symbolism. While
it is true that terminal sedation can effectively constitute euthanasia, and
that terminal sedation can be abused more than assisted suicide, terminal
sedation looks on the surface more like the accepted practices of aggres-
sive comfort care and treatment withdrawal than like assisted suicide or
euthanasia. Moreover, in practice, it appears to be limited to only appro-
priate cases. No one is suggesting that physicians are administering termi-
nal sedation to people who are not seriously ill or who really should be
treated with psychological counseling and anti-depressive drugs.96 In con-
trast, there is real concern that Dr. Kevorkian is assisting the suicides of
persons who are not seriously ill or who have serious psychological prob-
lems.9 7 In addition, there are many suicides in this country that are com-
mitted by people who are psychologically depressed, but who have no se-
rious physical illness. The Court may have been concerned about the
message to these-people if assisted suicide for terminally ill persons was
permitted.9
Nevertheless, the Court's deference to symbolic considerations cre-
ates its own problems of symb6lismi-assisted suicide is rejected only by
embracing euthanasia. Moreover, the symbolic benefits come at a signifi-
cant cost to patients. As discussed, the patients who are denied assisted
suicide, and who therefore must choose terminal sedation, are forced into a
less desirable alternative. In addition, the permissibility of terminal seda-
tion poses greater risks than assisted suicide for incompetent patients who
would not want to die, but whose families or physicians think ought to
die.99
95. As discussed, supra text accompanying notes 71-83, terminal sedation poses greater
risks to patient welfare than does physician-assisted suicide.
96. To be sure, this might reflect the fact that terminal sedation is not used very widely. As
physicians begin to use it more, the chances of abuse will increase.
97. See Clash in Detroit Over How ll a Kevorkian Client Really Was, N.Y. TvMS, Aug 20,
1996, atAl3.
98. See Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272 (discussing the seriousness of suicide as a public
health problem).
99. Such thoughts may reflect genuine efforts to carry out the patient's interests or might
reflect subconscious responses to the burdens of caring for the patient or the economic constraints
of managed care.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
VI. Conclusion
Beneath the Supreme Court's apparent adherence to the distinction
between treatment withdrawal and assisted suicide or euthanasia is a blur-
ring of that distinction. By accepting-even endorsing-terminal sedation
while rejecting assisted suicide, the Court has given physicians permission
to employ a treatment that is essentially a form of euthanasia.
In some ways, this is an appropriate step. It permits patients to retain
their ability to avoid severe suffering without having to sacrifice their right
to refuse life-sustaining treatment in the process. It also elevates function
over form. As a type of euthanasia, terminal sedation is problematic in its
form. Nevertheless, the Court's acceptance of the practice is a signal that
the overriding consideration in right-to-die law is the moral sentiment that
dying patients who are suffering intolerably should be able to end their
lives, even if they have to do so via euthanasia.
There are also serious problems with the Court's approach. By
choosing terminal sedation over assisted suicide, the Court has taken a path
that is ethically more problematic than the alternative of recognizing a
right to assisted suicide. Terminal sedation serves fewer of the purposes of
right-to-die law while posing a greater threat to patient welfare.
All of this suggests that the states are likely to gradually lift their pro-
hibitions against physician-assisted suicide. 00 Because terminal sedation
serves fewer of the purposes of right-to-die law than assisted suicide, there
will still be important unmet needs of dying patients. In addition, because
the availability of terminal sedation means that legalizing physician-
assisted suicide will reduce rather than increase the risks to patient welfare,
assisted suicide can be justified in terms of protecting patients from abuse.
100. The states will no doubt consider the experience of Oregon with assisted suicide, now
that the state's voters have reaffirmed Oregon's assisted suicide statute, and the Supreme Court
has declined to consider a legal challenge to the statute.
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